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Physician-Assisted Suicide
I. INTRODUCTION
The practice of euthanasia-a deliberate, life-terminating act adminis-
tered upon a mentally competent, terminally ill patient, at the patient's
request, designed to peacefully end insufferable pain--dates back to
ancient times when physicians' ethics obligated them to aid in ending
their patients' interminable suffering.' In America, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court made the first legal acknowledgment of the right to elect
euthanasia as a medical treatment in 1976 when it held that the right to
privacy encompassed Karen Quinlan's right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment.' Fourteen years later, the United States Supreme
Court recognized the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.3
The swelling numbers of terminally ill Americans, the technological
advances that enable them to live longer, and the legal barriers to the
ability of a terminally ill patient to seek professional aid in ending the
suffering and anguish accompanying terminal illness have recently come
to a head." Increased media coverage of the suicide assistance provided
by Dr. Jack Kevorkian and others has thrust physician-assisted suicide
into the foreground of public scrutiny, demanding legal attention to the
issue.'
The debate over physician-assisted suicide pits religion against sci-
ence, and privacy against government intervention in the most emotion-
1. Cara Ellin, Note, Renewed Compassion for the Dying in Compassion in Dying
v. State of Washington, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L REv. 1, 8 (1996). See Tom L
Beauchamp, The Justification of Physician-Assisted Deaths, 29 IND. L REV. 1173,
1175 (1996). This type of euthanasia is modernly termed "active euthanasia" and is
contrasted with "passive euthanasia"-the intentional forbearance of lifesaving proce-
dures on terminally ill individuals. Id.
2. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64 (N.J. 1976).
3. 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
4. Christopher N. Manning, Live and Let Die?: Physician-Assisted Suicide and
the Right to Die, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 513, 513 (1996).
5. Id.
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ally charged, controversial issue of life and death since Roe v. Wade.'
The practice squarely conflicts with the Christian belief that only God
may choose the time and manner of one's death.7 The American Medi-
cal Association opposes the practice as violative of the Hippocratic
Oath.' Yet, last year, twenty-six percent of physicians received requests
for suicide assistance.
The first victory for proponents of physician-assisted suicide came in
the Ninth Circuit case Compassion in Dying v. Washington. ° Meticu..
lously crafted by Judge Stephen Reinhardt, who is often deemed the
most liberal judge in the federal judiciary," the opinion recognized a
protected Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in the ability to con-
trol the time and manner of one's death. 2 Four weeks after the Ninth
Circuit handed down the Compassion opinion, the Second Circuit fol.-
lowed suit by striking down a similar New York statute as violative of
the Equal Protection Clause in Quill v. Vacco.'3 Though the parties
fought their battles on different coasts and won with different weapons,
the message is clea. Americans increasingly demand the right to die
with dignity.
14
Although the Cruzan court specifically declined to decide whether
the right to privacy, which protects the right of a competent person to
refuse life-saving treatment, permits a physician to administer life-end-
ing treatment upon the request of a similarly competent patient, the
Court can no longer remain silent on the issue. 5 Currently, forty states
have laws prohibiting the practice. 6 A bi-circuit split on the issue, an
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Joan Beck, Assisted Suicide Is a Difficult Issue into
Which Courts Must Delve; Individuals and Physicians Must Also Be Heard, GREENS-
BORO NEWS & REC., Oct. 21, 1996, at AT.
7. Elldn, supra note 1, at 9; see also Matthew P. Previn, Note, Assisted Suicide
and Religion: Conflicting Conceptions of the Sanctity of Human Life, 84 GEO. LJ.
589, 591 (1996) (postulating that anti-physician-assisted suicide laws violate the Es-
tablishment Clause "by endorsing a particular religious conception of the sanctity of
life-).
8. Beck, supra note 6, at A7.
9. Id.
10. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117
S. Ct 37 (1996).
11. Tom Bates, Ninth Offers Unique Order in Court of Last Resort, PORTLAN)
OREGONIAN, Sept. 22, 1996, at Al; William Carlsen, Frontier Justice, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
6, 1996, at 1Z7.
12. Compassion, 79 F.3d at 838.
13. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct 36 (1996).
14. See Barbara Dority, "In the Hands of the People:" Recent Victories of the
Death-with-Dignity Movement, THE HUMANIST, July 17, 1996, at 6 (reporting a recent
survey finding that 73% of all Americans approve of physician-assisted suicide for
terminally ill, competent adults).
15. See Elkin, supra note 1, at 13.
16. Several States Join in Supreme Court Brief Seeking to Uphold Assisted Sui-
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upsurge in state initiatives regarding the practice, and the seemingly
daily increase in Kevorkian-assisted suicide incidents have dropped
physician-assisted suicide into the lap of widespread public discussion
and have made the issue "ripe for the Supreme Court to decide."' 7 Ap-
parently recognizing the timeliness of the issue, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari on both Qui/! and Compassion,"8 and heard argu-
ments on these companion cases in January 1997.'"
This Comment analyzes the current state of the law on physician-
assisted suicide with a focus on the Second and Ninth Circuits and
their respective opinions on the right of mentally competent, terminally
ill adults to seek physician assistance in ending their lives.2 This Com-
ment discusses the current grassroots campaigns in various states to
pass initiatives supporting the practice,2' and the counter-effort by oth-
er states to block such efforts.' Finally, this Comment concludes with
an analysis of how the Supreme Court might decide the issue and the
possible legal repercussions of the decision on the terminally ill and the
evolution of individual rights.'
cide Ban, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Sept. 10, 1996, available in 1996 WL 508257 [hereinaf-
ter Several States].
17. Brian Harmon, Suicide Issue Fodder for High Court, DETRorr NEWS, Apr. 4,
1996, at D3; see also Right to Die Advocates Gain 2nd Legal Victory, PORTLAND ORE-
GONIAN, Apr. 3, 1996, at Al.
18. Compassion was given the less compelling caption of Washington v.
Glucksberg on appeaL See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
19. Transcript of Oral Argument at *1, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), available in 1997
WL 13671.
20. See iftra notes 24-97 and accompanying text.
21. See Edward Grant, Legal/Legislative Issues in Euthanasia and Physician-As-
sisted Suicide, 36 CATH. LAW. 357, 358-68 (1996) (discussing initiatives in California,
Michigan, and Washington state); Kevin M. Stansbury, Note, Physician Assisted Sui-
cide--Due Process, The Right to Die, Equal Protection and Slippery Slopes. Compas-
sion in Dying v. Washington, 31 LAND & WATER L REV. 623, 628-31 (1996) (examining
state efforts to extend privacy rights to include right to physician-assisted suicide);
infra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
22. See Several States, supra note 16; infra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 118-89 and accompanying text Kathryn L Sisk Tucker, the at-
torney for Compassion in Dying, predicted a six-to-three vote split, with conservative
Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist refusing to allow the practice.
Andrew Blum, Defender Proffers Fees: Susan Smith's Lawyer Gives $83,000 to Re-
source Center, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 15, 1996, at A7. A look at the reversal rate of the
circuits, however, reveals a less optimistic picture, because both the Second and
Ninth Circuits have high reversal rates in the Supreme Court. Between 1989 and
1994, the high Court reversed the Second Circuit 6796 of the time. Deborah Pines,
Reasons for Reversal Differ Among Judges, N.Y.U., Aug. 1, 1994, at 6. During the
1329
II. THE CASES
A. Compassion in Dying v. Washington: A Fundamental Right to Die
1. Background
The Washington physician-assisted suicide statute provides that "'[a]
person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly
causes or aids another person to attempt suicide,'" a felony subject to
imprisonment and fines of up to five years and $10,000 respectively.'
Four physicians, three terminally ill patients seeking to hasten death
with prescription drugs, and Compassion in Dying, a Washington-based
organization providing assistance to this type of terminally ill patient,
challenged the "or aids" provision of the statute in a federal district
court.25 They moved for summary judgment, arguing that the law was
unconstitutional both on its face and as applied because it prevented
terminally ill patients from exercising a liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," and because it
treated similarly situated individuals differently in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.27 Although the district court denied summary judg-
ment as to the claims raised by the physicians and Compassion in Dy-
ing, it granted summary judgment for the patients on both grounds but
only to the extent that the statute restricted physician-assisted sui-
cide.' The State of Washington appealed the grant of summary judg-
ment to the Ninth Circuit where a three-judge panel reversed the dis-
1995-96 Term, the Supreme Court reversed 10 of the 12 Ninth Circuit cases and two
of the four Second Circuit cases argued. Marcia Coyle, Term Reveals Pragmatic Su-
preme Court, NAT'L UJ., July 29, 1996, at C2; see also Stansbury, supra note 21, at
643 (suggesting that the Supreme Court may find a right to assisted suicide under a
personal autonomy theory).
24. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 794 (9th Cir.), cert. granted
sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996) (quoting WASH. REv. CODE
§ 9A 36.060 (1988) (emphasis in original) and citing WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9A
36.060(2), 20.020 (1)(c)).
25. Id. at 794, 797-98.
26. The Due Process Clause states in pertinent part "No State shall ... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONSr.
amend. XIV, § 2.
27. Compassion, 79 F.3d at 798. The Equal Protection Clause provides in pertinent
part- "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
28. Compassion, 79 F.3d at 797; Elkin, supra note 1, at 5-6 (reviewing the bases
of the district court's opinion).
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trict court's ruling.' "Because of the extraordinary importance of this
case, [the Ninth Circuit] decided to rehear it en banc."3
2. The Court Decides
Led by Judge Stephen Reinhardt, the limited en banc court found a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in determining the time and
manner of one's death, and held that the court must balance this inter-
est against the State's interests in the preservation of life.." Judge
Reinhardt's majority opinion, reminiscent of a law review article, em-
braced a comprehensive analysis of substantive due process interests
versus fundamental due process rights and recognized the Supreme
Court's reluctance to find new fundamental rights.n It employed an ex-
tensive review of historical and contemporary societal attitudes toward
suicide, from Socrates to the present day.' The opinion concluded by
holding that the "or aids" provision of the statute violated the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "as applied to terminally ill
competent adults who wish to hasten their deaths with medication
prescribed by their physicians. "'
29. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd en banc,
Compassion, 79 F.3d at 798.
30. Compassion, 79 F.3d at 798.
31. Id. at 793. The Ninth Circuit is the only "appellate court in the federal sys-
tem ... which permits a case to be reheard by a limited en banc court." Compas-
sion in Dying, 85 F.3d 1440, 1441 (9th Cir.) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting), cert. granted
sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
32. See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 803-06.
33. See id. at 806-14.
34. Id. at 837. The Ninth Circuit rooted this decision in the fundamental rights cas-
es of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which
the court determined compelled the use of a balancing test. Compassion, 79 F.3d at
816. Thus, the en banc court weighed the State's interest in preserving life, prevent-
ing suicide, avoiding the involvement of third parties and precluding the rise of un-
due influence, protecting children and family members, protecting the integrity of the
medical profession, and avoiding adverse results against the fundamental liberty inter-
est in hastening one's death. Id. at 816-37. The court ultimately concluded that the
State's interests paled in comparison to the "individual's interest in deciding whether
to end his agony and suffering by hastening the time of his death with medication
prescribed by his physician." Id. at 837. Recognizing the limited scope of the holding,
Judge Reinhardt noted that this conclusion-that the statute is unconstitutional as
applied to a group of persons-is "atypical but not uncommon." Id. at 798 n.9.
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a. A liberty interest in choosing the time and manner of one's
death
Before determining whether the Washington statute offended the
Constitution, the court had to conclude that a constitutionally protected
right existed. Judge Reinhardt began by regarding the teachings of two
legendary dissenters-Justices Harlan and Brandeis-who cautioned
that the courts should not arbitrarily nor purposelessly restrain liberty
interests.' He emphasized the vision of the Framers in "'conferr[ing],
as against the government, the right to be let alone-the most compre.-
hensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized men.'"' He
then noted the "compelling similarities" between the right-to-die cases
and the abortion cases, 7 and recognized the guidance the abortion
cases could provide to the disposition of the right-to-die cases.' Judge
Reinhardt then launched into an historical and legal analysis of the right
to receive an abortion,' concluding that the similarity between the
two issues compelled the court to "examine whether Washington's ban
on assisted suicide unconstitutionally restricts the exercise of that liber-
ty interest."
4
As the first step in that examination, the court determined exactly
how to characterize the liberty interest at issue.4' Judge Reinhardt re-
jected the connotation of "a liberty interest in committing suicide,"
finding that title too restrictive and inaccurate.42 Instead, he preferred
more inclusive terms, such as "'the right to die,'" "'determining the time
35. Compassion, 79 F.3d at 800; see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S 497, 543 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting), overnded by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
36. Compassion, 79 F.3d at 800 (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
37. Id. In both cases, "the relative strength of the competing interests changes as
physical, medical, or related circumstances vary," similar religious and moral concern-;
are aroused, and history reflects years of condemnation of the practice, forcing it
dangerously into back alleys. Id. at 800-01. Moreover, the legal and constitutional
principles involved in both types of cases are the same. Id. at 801.
38. Id. at 801.
39. Id. Judge Reinhardt reviewed the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe and Casey,
distilling from them a two-step due process analysis: determining the existence of a
right, then examining whether the law places an undue burden on the exercise of
that liberty interest Compassion, 79 F.3d at 801-02 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 833;
Roe, 410 U.S. at 113).
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and manner of one's death,'" and "'hastening one's death'"4 with the
prescriptive aid of a physician."
The court then analyzed the scope of the Due Process Clause and its
application to this asserted liberty interest.4 Because there is no "lit-
mus test" to use in determining whether a liberty interest is protected,
the court reviewed the evolution of the various approaches to Four-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence and rejected an historical evidence
approach.' The court instead held that the contemporary compassion
for the terminally ill and the Supreme Court's recognition in Cruzan
that "there is a due process liberty interest in rejecting unwanted medi-
cal treatment, including the provision of food and water by artificial
means," necessarily indicate that there is a liberty interest in controlling
the time and manner of one's death-a right to die.47
b. The balancing act-the right to die with dignity outweighs any
state interest
Legitimate liberty interest in tow, Judge Reinhardt turned to the
State's interests in abrogating the right to die. He identified the follow-
ing six state interests furthered by Washington's statutory ban on sui-
cide assistance: (1) "preserving life," (2) "preventing suicide," (3) "avoid-
ing the involvement of third parties and curtailing the use of undue
influence," (4) "protecting dependents from the hastened death of a
terminally ill provider," (5) "protecting the integrity of the medical pro-
43. Id, The judge further expressed his doubt that the court should term the con-
duct at issue "suicide." Id.
44. Id. As Judge Reinhardt clarified, the opinion only relates to "the prescribing of
medication by a physician for the purpose of enabling a patient to end his life" be-
cause that was the only conduct the plaintiffs challenged under the statute. Id.
45. Id. at 802-06.
46. Id. The judge noted that, while the history of a claimed liberty interest "plays
a useful role" in determining its existence, significant cases have rejected the notion
that the historical perspective is talismanic. Id, at 805. For example, in Casey, the
Supreme Court held that the historical antipathy for, and prohibition of, abortion was
no barrier to recognizing a liberty interest in the practice. Id. at 805 (citing Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992)). Similarly, had history guided the
decision in Loving v. Virginia, the Court would not have displaced miscegenation
laws as unconstitutionally violative of equal protection and' substantive due process.
Id, at 805-06 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). For further discussion see infra
notes 119-78..
47. Compassion, 79 F.3d at 815-16 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990)).
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fession," and (6) keeping the lid on the Pandora's Box that could open
if the court declared the statute unconstitutional.' None of these inter-
ests, however, were compelling enough to "outweigh the terminally ill
individual's interest in deciding whether to end his agony and suffering
by hastening the time of his death with medication prescribed by his
physician."49 The court concluded that although the state may regulate
physician-assisted suicide,0 any ban prohibiting doctors from
prescriptively assisting the terminally ill to hasten death "unconstitu-
tionally burdens the liberty interests of the terminally il."'1 In light of
the due process violation, the court declined to take up the equal pro-
tection issue. 2
3. Intracircuit Conflict
On June 12, 1996, the court denied a request for the entire court to
rehear the case en banc.' The request failed to receive a majority of
the non-recused active judges' votes, and in response, Judge
O'Scannlain, not a member of the en banc court, rendered a scathing
dissent.' Judge O'Scannlain censured the court for "lay[ing] the foun-
dation for the discovery of an endless parade of protected liberty inter-
ests,"' and denounced their Compassion decision as "a shockingly
broad act of judicial legislation."'
48. Id at 816-17. As Judge Reinhardt explained, "[nlo decision is more painful,
delicate, personal, important, or final than the decision how and when one's life shall
end." Id. at 837.
49. Id. at 837.
50. The court recommended careful regulation of the practice as a safeguard to
ensure that the practice does not escape the boundaries contemplated by its circum-
scribed holding. Id. at 832-33.
51. Id. at 838. The court also addressed the opinion of the District Court of Or-
gon in Lee v. Oregon, which held that the Oregon Death With Dignity Act, a voter
initiative effectively permitting the same practice deemed protected by the Compas-
sion decision, was an unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at
837 (citing Lee, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1438 (D. Or. 1995), vacated and remanded No. 95-
35804, 1997 WL 80783 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 1997), and amended by No. 95-35804, 1997
WL 128500 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 1997)). Judge Reinhardt essentially overruled the district
court's decision, deeming its reasoning erroneous and in conflict with the reasoning
and legal conclusions of Compassion. Id. at 837-38.
52. Id. at 838 ("One constitutional violation is enough to support the judgment that
we reach here.").
53. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440, 1440 (9th Cir.), cert. granted
sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
54. Id. (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting); see supra note 31 (discussing the Ninth
Circuit's limited en banc procedure).
55.. Compassion, 85 F.3d at 1444 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1442 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
1334
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Although her discussion began with disapproval of the Ninth Circuit
practice of rehearing cases in a "limited en banc" setting when there is
an opinion by a three-judge panel, Judge O'Scannlain promptly ex-
pressed that the issue decided in Compassion was best left "to the
popularly elected representatives of Washington, who are more capable
than [the court] of deciding whether to recognize the exception desired
by" and conferred upon the Compassion plaintiffs."7 She also ex-
pressed disagreement with the merits of the court's decision in Com-
passion, stating her belief that Casey recognized no fundamental right
to an abortion, and thus rendered the Compassion court's legal founda-
tion for its decision unsound.' This lack of legal foundation, Judge
O'Scannlain propounded, marked the court's extrapolation of a funda-
mental right to physician-assisted suicide' "one of the most egregious
judicial leaps."' Judge O'Scannlain concluded her discourse by warn-
ing that "this case is not about aggressive pain management," because
the state has never jailed a physician for over-medicating a terminally ill
patient, provided the underlying intent is to lessen pain."1
B. Quill v. Vacco: Equal Protection
1. Background
Quill v. Vacco' originated from two New York statutes which pro-
hibited the assistance of suicide.' Three physicians and three terminal-
ly ill patients seeking to end their lives with the aid of prescribed drugs
filed suit to have the statutes declared unconstitutional as applied to
physicians who seek to assist terminally ill, mentally competent adults
wishing to hasten their deaths." They also sought to enjoin future en-
forcement of the laws.' Just as in Compassion, the plaintiffs grounded
their claim in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses.'
57. Id. at 1443 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1443-44 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
59. See supra notes 4547 and accompanying text (analyzing the en banc court's
historically based determination of the right to physican-assisted suicide).
60. Compassion, 85 F.3d at 1444 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1446 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
62. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996).
63. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.30, 125.15(3) (McKinney 1987).
64. QuiU, 80 F.3d at 719.
65. Id.
66. Id.; see supra notes 26 and 27 for text of clauses.
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The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary in-
junction but found a justiciable issue and decided the case on its mer-
its." The court refused to find a protected fundamental liberty interest
in physician-assisted suicide, however, and further held that the plain-
tiffs showed no equal protection violation.' The plaintiffs then ap-
pealed to the Second Circuit.'
2. Second Circuit Analysis: Rejection of a Due Process
Right-Acknowledgment of an Equal Protection Violation
a. No due process right to die
Based on the Supreme Court's reluctance in Bowers v. Hardwickv°
to find new fundamental rights which lack "ancient roots" in societal
history, the court could find no such foundation for the right to assisted
suicide and thus declined invitation to expand substantive due process
to encompass the right.7' The court explained that there was "no cog-
nizable basis in the Constitution's language or design" for recognizing a
due process right to die with dignity.'
b. Equal protection violation
The Second Circuit court was far more receptive to the plaintiffs'
claim that, because a competent person may order the removal of life
support systems to voluntarily end his or her life,73 the prohibition of
physician-assisted, voluntary life cessation by one who is not on life
support violates the Equal Protection Clause.74 As the court explained,
a state statute governing social welfare receives rational basis scruti-
67. Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Quill v.
Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), and cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996).
68. Id. at 84-85.
69. Quill, 80 F.3d at 717.
70. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding no fundamental liberty interest in homosexual sod-
omy).
71. Quill, 80 F.3d at 724 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at '192).
72. Id. at 724-25.
73. The Supreme Court conferred this right in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't (f
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
74. Quill, 80 F.3d at 727-28.
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ny,75 and the courts will presume the statute valid if the law bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.8
The court noted that New York has sustained a long-standing recogni-
tion of a competent adult's right to refuse medical treatment and force
the removal of life support systems,r7 while simultaneously refusing to
permit a similarly competent, terminally ill person not dependent upon
life support to hasten death with the aid of a physician's prescription.'
The court considered, but rejected, the district court judge's justifica-
tion for this disparate treatment-that there is "a difference between
allowing nature to take its course... and intentionally using an artifi-
cial death-producing device."' This "action-inaction distinction,"' ex-
plained the court, is meritless, as death by either method is unnatu-
ral." If anything, the court observed, death by self-administration of
prescribed drugs involves less physician action than the removal of
artificial support inducing starvation, dehydration, and asphyxiation.'
75. Id. at 725 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).
The court reviewed the various standards of review for legislation, noting that
"[w]hile rational basis scrutiny governs judicial review of the constitutionality of legis-
lation in the areas of social welfare and economics, strict scrutiny is the standard of
review where a classification 'impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a funda-
mental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.'" Id. at 726
(citations omitted) (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
312 (1976)). Because the court concluded that this case involved neither a fundamen-
tal right nor a suspect class, rational basis scrutiny was the appropriate standard of
review. Id.
76. Id. at 725 (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440).
77. Id. at 727. New York case law has consistently recognized this right since
1914, when Judge Cardozo stated that "'[e]very human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his body.'" Id. (quoting
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (1914)). Similarly, New
York legislation is replete with provisions such as "do not resuscitate orders" and
health care proxies. Id. at 727-28.
78. Id. at 729.
79. Id. (quoting Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd sub
nom. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2nd Cir.), and cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996)).
80. Id. (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296-97
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)). In Cruzan, Justice Scalia rejected the same distinction
and noted that "the cause of death in both cases is the suicide's conscious decision
to 'pu[t] an end to his own existence.'" Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296-97 (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (quoting 4 WnLuAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189 (alteration in original)).
81. Quilt, 80 F.3d at 729.
82. Id.
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The determination that similarly-situated individuals receive divergent
treatment, however, is not dispositive to the equal protection analysis.
As long as the disparate treatment is rationally linked to a compelling
state interest, the difference in treatment does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.' In making this inquiry, the court asked, "[W]hat
business is it of the state to require the continuation of agony when the
result is imminent and inevitable? "' The court also reviewed the state
interests evaluated by the Compassion court, and held that, like the
Washington law, the New York statutes served no legitimate state inter-
est that would excuse the unequal treatment they sanctioned.' In the
words of Judge Miner, "Physicians do not fulfill the role of 'killer' by
prescribing drugs to hasten death any more than they do by disconnect-
ing life support systems. "' Accordingly, because the court found no
legally significant difference between hastening one's death by removing
a life-support system and administering a lethal dose of medication to
achieve the same result, the Second Circuit concluded that the statutory
ban on physician-assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 7
c. Judge Calabresi's concurrence
Judge Calabresi issued a lengthy concurrence in Quil to express his
belief that the majority's opinion 'was overreaching and unnecessarily
broad in scope.' After an historical review of Cruzan, Casey, and
83. Id. The burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the law bears no rational
relationship to any legitimate state interest Id.
84. Id. at 730.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 731. This holding is particularly exceptional in light of the usual
toothless application of the rational basis test See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Okla, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (ushering in the modem era of judicial restraint
and recognizing that "[tihe day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws . . . because they may be
unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought."). It ap-
pears that the court applied a more focused rational basis test similar to that applied
in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cir.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985), and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), which focuses on the
actual, as opposed to conceivable, purpose of the law, and whether the law directly
advances that purpose. See also Maureen M. Devlin, Nota Bene: Quill v. Vacco, 12
IssuEs L & MED. 65, 66 (1996) (discussing the court's finding of rational basis as the
appropriate standard of review); Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Second Circuit
Review: The Right to Die, N.Y.LJ., Apr. 24, 1996, at 3 (discussing the history of, and
decision in, Quill).
88. Quill, 80 F.3d at 732 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
1338
[Vol. 24: 1325, 1997] Physician-Assisted Suicide
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Compassion, he concluded that neither case law nor the Constitution
invalidated the laws banning physician-assisted suicide.'
m1. LEAVING IT UP TO THE STATES?: THE SCALIA APPROACH
Like many advocates of judicial restraint, Justice Scalia believes that
the legality of physician-assisted suicide is best left to the legislature.
He has professed, "I'm not a guru sitting on some windswept Tibetan
mountain waiting for someone to ask a question like 'Is there a right to
die? '"9' According to Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court has no business
acknowledging rights not specifically enumerated in the Constitution."1
This opinion is consistent with Justice Scalia's position expressed in his
Cruzan concurrence.' Although he agreed with the majority's ultimate
conclusion that a state requirement allowing the withdrawal of life
support only upon finding clear and convincing evidence that the artifi-
cial sustenance is against the wishes of the patient,'M Justice Scalia
stated, "I would have preferred that we announce, clearly and promptly,
that the federal courts have no business in this field; that American law
has always accorded the State the power to prevent, by force if neces-
89. Id. at 738 (Calabresi, J., concurring). Judge Calabresi was also concerned that
the court had decided the merits of the case without first identifying the legitimate
interests the state sought to promote through the anti-suicide assistance laws. Id. at
742 (Calabresi, J., concurring). In light of New York's liberal abortion laws, death
penalty position, and acknowledgment of a patient's right to order removal of life-sus-
taining mechanisms, Judge Calabresi could not accept that the state's interests were
in life preservation. Id. at 740-41 (Calabresi, J., concurring); see also Devlin, supra
note 87, at 67 (discussing Judge Calabresi's concurrence).
90. Harmon, supra note 17, at D3.
91. David Reed, Judges Make Poor Laumakers, Scalia Says, RICHMOND TIMES, Apr.
3, 1996, at B4. Judge O'Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals shares this
view. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
92. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292-93 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia expressed this same sentiment during an address to the
Pepperdine University School of Law. He suggested that the American system should
follow the English model and let the legislature, not the Court, determine and legis-
late the evolving standards of decency. Justice Antonin Scalia, Address at Pepperdine
University School of Law (Jan. 22, 1997).
93. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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sary, suicide... ." The impropriety of the Court's occupation of this
field, Justice Scalia declared, was due to the fact that
the point at which life becomes "worthless," and the point at which the means
necessary to preserve it become "extraordinary" or "inappropriate," are neither set
forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine Justices of this Court any better
than they are known to nine people picked at random from the Kansas City tele-
phone directory."
The strength of Justice Scalia's conviction to these principles of judi-
cial restraint and enumerated rights casts serious doubt on the notion
that he would find a protected liberty interest in a terminally ill
individual's right to physician assistance in the termination of his or her
life.' Justice Scalia's ideology will likely lead to judicial silence on the
existence or scope of the right, a result that will leave the regulation of
physician-assisted suicide up to the legislatures or citizenry of the fifty
states."
94. Id. (Scali, J., concurring). But see Leonard John Deftos, Is There a Consti-
tutional Right to Die, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRiB., Jan. 10, 1997, at B9 (arguing that "this
is exactly the function of the federal judiciary, and it has been so at least since
Article Ill was included in the Constitution in 1787, and certainly since Chief Justice
John Marshall's 1803 decision in Marbury vs. Madison").
95. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia took a similar
position with respect to the constitutional absence of an explicit statement concern-
ing a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. In his Casey concurrence and dis-
sent, he concluded that abortion is not a liberty interest protected by the Constitu-
tion because "(1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the long
standing traditions of American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed."
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in judgment in part). Justice Scalia further explained his
position by stating his belief "that the text of the Constitution, and our traditions, say
what they say and there is no fiddling with them." Id. at 998 (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment in part and dissenting in judgment in part). Moreover, in a recent
speech, Justice Scalia stated that it is "'absolutely plain that there is no right to die,'"
because there were anti-suicide laws on the books when the states adopted the Con-
stitution. Mark O'Keefe & Tom Bates, Supreme Court Takes up Assisted Suicide This
Week,, Justices Will Hear Arguments in Case with Potential to Change "Our Com-
plete Culture," ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 5, 1997, at 4B (quoting Justice Scalia).
96. Justice Scalla's severe criticism of any decision by the Court that appears to
charter new territory in the field of individual rights as lacking "reasoned judgment"
further illustrates that he is unlikely to support anything other than state regulation
of the right to die. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 983 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in judgment in part) (noting the lack of reasoned judgment in the
Roe abortion decision); see also Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1637 (1996) (Scai,
J., dissenting) (denouncing the majority's holding unconstitutional a Colorado consti-
tutional amendment forcing homosexuals to amend the constitution before they could
receive preferential treatment as lacking any "foundation in American constitutional
law"). For a discussion of unprincipled decisions, see generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT
& THOMAS D. ROwE, JR., CONSTrrUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 17-37
(1993).
97. See Donald L Beschle, The Role of Courts in the Debate on Assisted Suicide:
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A. Death by Direct Democracy
The practice of physician-assisted suicide could become part of state
law through direct democracy, namely, initiatives and referenda The
voter initiative power enables the citizenry to precipitate change indepen-
dent from the often unsympathetic agendas of loliticians.' By referen-
dum, the populace may curtail the application of unpopular laws enacted
by the state legislature.' Although there currently exists no national
initiative power, nearly half the states have given their electorate the
ability to legislate directly. °
The citizens of Oregon attempted the initiative approach to physician-
assisted suicide by enacting the "Death With Dignity Act" in 1994.01 Un-
fortunately, in August 1995, a court enjoined the Act as unconstitution-
al."° The electorates of both California and Washington attempted sim-
ilar provisions with even less success. In 1991, Washington assisted-sui-
cide proponents succeeded in getting a measure on the ballot to autho-
rize "aid-in-dying."'" Washington's Initiative 119 fell short of passage by
five percent of the vote after voters succumbed to the media offensive
that hailed the measure as lacking adequate safeguards."°
In 1992, CAlifornia's Proposition 161 met a similar fate when an effec-
tive media blitz turned voters against the ballot provision by exploiting
fears of inadequate regulation. 5 Although the initiative offered defini-
A Communitarian Approach, 9 NoTRE DAME J.L ETIuCS & PuB. POL'Y 367, 402 (1995)
(explaining that states' approaches will vary).
98. For a discussion of the initiative and referendum powers, see generally Stephen
K Sutro, Interpretation of Initiatives by Reference to Similar Statutes: Canons of
Construction Do NotAdequately Measure Voter Intent, 34 SA4TA CLARA L REv. 945,
946 (1994). KK DuVivier provides a thorough discussion of the history of the voter
initiative in By Going Wrong All Things Come Right. Using Alternate Initiatives to
Improve Citizen Lawmaking, 63 U. cQ. L REv. 1185 (1995).
99. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTrnIONAL LAw 719-20 (2d ed. 1993). For a
comparison of the initiative and referendum powers, see David B. Magleby, Let the
Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. Cow.
L REV. 13 (1995).
100. Magleby, supra note 99, at 14-15, 42.
101. Stephanie Hinz, US. Supreme Court to Decide Whether Terminally Ill Have
Right to Commit Physician-Assisted Suicide, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 3, 1996, avail-
able in 1996 WL 559225, at *2.
102. Id.
103. Grant, supra note 21, at 361.
104. Id. at 361-62 & n.29.
105. Id. at 363.
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tions for terms such as "terminal condition,"'10 it failed to contain a
provision for informed consent or a definition for its requirement that
the patient's death plea be an "enduring request.""°
Although previous attempts at direct legislation of the right to die
failed, the support that has rallied around the cause in the five years
since California's Proposition 116 makes it unlikely that this dismal a
showing will repeat itself.'8 Just as public acceptance of a woman's
right to an abortion did not build overnight, so too has support for the
right for a terminally ili patient to end his or her interminable suffering
been slow-coming."W As Oregon's Death with Dignity Act illustrates,
however, sufficient public support for physician-assisted suicide now ex-
ists, making direct legislation of the right possible and desirable."' On
the eve of the Supreme Court's hearing oral argument on physican-assist-
ed suicide, polls showed that nearly sixty percent of Americans support-
ed legalizing the practice."' If those polled vote their minds, the termi-
nally ill may find some relief from ballot-casters, even if the Scalia camp
prevails.
B. Death by Representation
State legislatures could also recognize the right to die by permittin
the practice only in certain situations, thus drawing arbitrary lines of
demarcation."' Absent a decision like Roe, specifically defining the
scope of the right and the permissible governmental interference with
that right,"3 uniformity among the states is unlikely.
Notwithstanding the lack of consistency, however, state legislation of
the right is not without benefits. Even if the Supreme Court finds no
protection under either the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses for
physician-assisted suicide, the states may still support and protect the
practice by finding a greater level of protection under their own state
constitutions which afford "a font of individual liberties.""4
106. Id,
107. Id. at 366-67.
108. See Dority, supra note 14, at 6 (discussing the recent upsurge in American
support for physician-assisted suicide).
109. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 800-01, cert. granted sub
nom., Washington v. Gluckburg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
110. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
111. Cathy Young, Have the Courts Undermined Culture?, DETRorr NEWS, Jan. 14,
1997, at A9.
112. Champions of the assisted suicide cause have already begun to propose legisla-
tion to tackle the issue. Id.
113. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (thoroughly summarizing and repeat-
ing the essential holdings of the Court).
114. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
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Despite public support for the right to die, the issue has not found
resounding support in the state legislatures. Between 1995 and 1996,
sixteen states proposed legalization legislation, but the bills did not re-
ceive the votes needed to become law."5 Perhaps a decision leaving the
issue up to the states will launch a grassroots campaign to rally the state
legislatures to resolve the issue in a manner consistent with the contem-
porary public position.
Should Justice Scalia obtain the support of four other justices, the
future of the right to die with dignity remains uncertain."18 Regardless
of whether the right is restricted or conferred by the legislatures or the
balloters, arbitrary or vague regulations will force the issue back into the
courtroom."7 The states could avoid much of that litigation, however, if
the Court finds that the right to die exists and provides a clear definition
of its scope.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE
Although the Scalia approach may find support in doctrines of judicial
restraint and enumerated rights, a refusal by the Court to legalize the
practice of physician-assisted suicide will not sit well with contemporary
Rights, 90 HARv. L REV. 489, 490-91 (1977), reprinted in WILuAMS, supra note 99, at
161-63. Because the Federal Constitution provides only the minimum standard of
rights protection, states can, and often do, provide a greater level of protection of
individual rights. See WIuAMS, supra note 99, at 194-95 (providing a comprehensive
discussion of a greater degree of rights protection by the states after the Supreme
Court has refused to extend federal constitutional protection).
115. Frank J. Murray, Assisted Suicide Goes to Top Court: Appellate Judges Toppled
State Bans, WAsL TRMES, Jan. 6, 1997, at Al.
116. Considering the support Justice Scalia received from Justice Thomas and Chief
Justice Rehnquist in his Romer dissent and his concurrence and dissent in Casey, it
is likely that this conservative triumvirate will maintain their status as bedfellows
through this controversy. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in judgment in part). Court watchers predict, based
on recent decisions in abortion cases, that Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
will be the swing voters on whom the outcome hinges. Tom Brazaitis, Court Weighs
Life and Death Issue: Arguments on 2 Cases of Physician-Assisted Suicide to Be
Heard, PLAI DEALER (Clev.), Jan 8, 1997, at IA
117. Murray, supra note 115, at Al. Some political pundits insist that "'Itihe more
direct legislation you have ... the greater the body of our judge-made law.'" WIL-
UAMS, supra note 99, at 720 (quoting George Lefcoe & Barney Allison, The Legal
Aspects of Proposition 13: The Amador Valley Case, 53 S. CAL. L REV. 173, 173
(1979)).
1343
constitutional jurisprudence-particularly the decisions in Roe, Casey,
Cruzan, and Romer. In these cases, the Court was willing to forge ahead
to create a just outcome without regard to the usual decisional r-
straints."18
A. Personal Autonomy
If the Court refuses to recognize the fundamental right to die with
dignity, the Justices will have to overcome the difficult obstacle of their
strong recognition of personal autonomy in Roe and again in Casey."'
The parallels between the abortion cases and the right to die are unmis-
takable. In his introduction to the majority opinion in Roe, Justice
Blackmun acknowledged
the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous
opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute
convictions that the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's
exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's
attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one
establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's
thinking and conclusions about abortion."
The current Court could use this same language as a template to intro-
duce the opinion in this case. Proponents of the right to die root their
argument in history, precedent, and a contemporary understanding of the
need for legalization of the practice.' Opponents pull their arguments
from religion," 2 concerns that legalization will undermine the reputa-
tion of the medical community by transforming healers into killers,"2
and the fear of opening the floodgates which would lead America down
the slippery slope to genocide." Although these conflicting concerns
118. The usual, neutral restraints on judicial decision making include principles of
stare decisis and proper application of standards of review. See GERHARDyr & ROW],
supra note 96, at 17-37.
119. See Stansbury, supra note 21, at 640 (predicting that the Supreme Court will
ground its recognition of the right to die in the doctrine of personal autonomy).
120. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
121. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted
sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
122. See, e.g., Grant, supra note 21, at 368 (urging opposition to the right to die
movement based on religious beliefs). See generally Previn, supra note 7 (thoroughly
discussing the religious tenets opposing physician-assisted suicide).
123. The American Medical Association (AMA) takes the position that suicide assis-
tance "is fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as healer." Laurie Wins-
low & Dana Sterling, Right-to-Die Argument Intensifies--Tulsa Experts Join National
Debate, TULSA TRm. & TuLsA WoR, Jan. 9, 1997, at Al. Instead, the AMA advocates
pain control through medication. Id.
124. See Robert L Kline, The Right to Assisted Suicide in Washington and Oregon"
The Courts Won't Allow a Northwest Passage, 5 B.U. PuB. INT. LJ. 213, 233 (1996).
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make for an emotionally charged debate over the issue, it is important
for the Court to recognize, as Justice Blackmun did in Roe, that the
judiciary's role "is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement,
free of emotion and of predilection."" The Court must remember Jus-
tice Holmes's warning in his Lochner v. New York 2 ' dissent that the
Framers wrote the Constitution for a diverse group of Americans with
conflicting viewpoints, and the Court's opinion of any perspective as
"shocking" should not be dispositive of the issue."2
Another parallel between the right to die and the abortion issues is the
existence of the practice despite legal proscriptions. Before the Court
decided Roe, women sought and obtained abortions under less than de-
sirable conditions, creating a serious health risk."~ Thus, the legaliza-
tion and regulation of abortion procedures advanced the compelling state
interest of patient safety."2
It is no secret that the terminally ill currently end their lives and suf-
fering through suicide. Some beg family members and loved ones to
administer the final blow."3 Others find sympathetic physicians who se-
cretly help patients with morphine injections and withdrawal of life sup-
port. '3 Still others make their final exit with a stranger who discretely
dispenses a welcome death in the back of his van." None of these
methods, are regulated to ensure the utmost safety to the patient.
Opponents of the right to abortion made a similar argument in insisting that the
legalization of the practice would lead to infanticide. Cheryl K. Smith, What About
Legalized Assisted Suicide?, 8 IssuEs L & MED. 503, 514-15 (1993). Regulations will
do much to quell these fears of mass extermination. By drawing the line at viability,
the Roe decision "created a handhold along the slippery slope." Carl E. Schneider,
Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CAL. L REV. 151, 168 (1988).
125. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
126. 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
127. Id (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 116-17.
128. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Brazaitis, supra note 116, at 1A (detailing the story of one mother
who eventually overcame her own emotions to carry out her terminally ill daughter's
request to end her suffering).
131. In his argument before the Court, Laurence Tribe noted this secret practice of
physician-assisted death. Steve Lash, Justices Wrestle with Whether Constitution Pro-
tects Doctor-Assisted Suicide, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL
14249, at *10.
132. Dr. Jack Kevorkian used this method to help more than 40 people leave their
terminally ill bodies. Mark O'Keefe & Tom Bates, The Freedom to Die, PORTLAND
OREGONiAN, Jan. 5, 1997, at B1.
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B. State Regulation of a Protected Liberty Interest
Although Roe recognized that the right to terminate a pregnancy is not
an unqualified right,' 3 Casey fully propounded the state's ability to reg-
ulate a liberty interest, provided that the regulation creates no undue
burden."3 Like Roe, Casey recognized the sensitive nature of privacy
issues such as abortion and reaffirmed the continued vitality of the per-
sonal autonomy interest defended in Roe: "At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, and of the mystery of human life."" The Court also emphasized
the need for governmental non-interference with these liberty interests,
because "[b]eliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State,"" and
one's destiny "must be shaped to a large extent on [one's] own concep-
tion of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.""'a Despite
Casey's reaffirmation of the strength of one's liberty interest in
"defin[ing] one's own concept of existence,"" Casey also plowed new
ground for state regulations of liberty interests, provided that the regula-
tions are reasonably related to a legitimate state goal and do not erect "a
substantial obstacle" to the free exercise of a constitutional right." Ac-
cordingly, in Casey the Court concluded that Pennsylvania's imposition
of a twenty-four hour waiting period and a parental consent provision for
minors were constitutional."4 A spousal consent requirement, however,
was unduly burdensome because it effectively subordinated a woman's
liberty interest to that of her husband.'
A similar approach led the Court to find a protected liberty interest in
a competent person's refusal of unwanted medical treatment in
Cruzan." Again, the Court noted the gravity of the decision, character-
izing "[tihe choice between life and death [as] a deeply personal decision
of obvious and overwhelming finality."" Although the Court only as-
sumed without deciding that an individual has "a right to die," the Court
concluded that a state could regulate the right by requiring proof by
clear and convincing evidence of an individual's preference for death
133. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
134. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
135. Id. at 851.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 852.
138. Id. at 851.
139. Id. at 877.
140. Id. at 887, 899. The twenty-four hour waiting period between counseling and
the abortion procedure is intended to foster informed decision making. Id. at 885.
141. Id. at 898.
142. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
143. Id. at 281.
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over artificial maintenance of life in a permanent vegetative state before
the withdrawal of life support.' " The Court rejected an approach per-
mitting withdrawal of life support upon the "substituted judgment" of
close family members, based on a concern that the substituted decision
might not adequately reflect the concerns of the individual patient.4 '
Cruzan and Casey have paved the way for the Court to recognize the
right to die, subject to certain state regulations. Cruzan illustrates that
the Court is willing to recognize the extremely personal nature of the
decision to terminate one's life and the Fourteenth Amendment's protec-
tion of the choice to refuse means of sustaining life.'46 By its affirma-
tion of Roe, Casey emphasizes one of the fundamental underpinnings of
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence-that the Court cannot define
liberty interests solely based on moral attitudes.4' A principled decision
on the right to physician assistance cannot ignore the strong precedential
value of Roe, Cruzan and Casey." Thus, any decision that does not
continue to recognize a liberty interest in rejecting governmental interfer-
ence with personal autonomy will signify a judicial retreat from promo-
tion of constitutional protection of liberty interests. As Laurence Tribe
remarked, such a decision risks "cutting the roots out under the tree of
liberty."149
C. The Unprincipled Decisions
Several recent decisions reflect the Court's willingness to be outcome
oriented in deciding tough issues. Roe, Cruzan, and Romer illustrate that
the Court can mold history and case law to fit a previously unrecognized
right when policy dictates."w In each case, the majority made the "just"
144. Id. at 284.
145. Id. at 286.
146. See id. at 281.
147. Sylvia A. Law, Physician-Assisted Death, An Essay on Constitutional Rights
and Remedies, 55 MD. L REV. 292, 315 (1996).
148. See supra note 96 (explaining the principled, or reasoned, decision approach).
149. O'Keefe & Bates, supra note 95, at 4B.
150. The one exception to this line of cases is Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986). This author believes that Bowers was simply too great an affront to the moral
majority for the Court to follow this policy-based approach. However, the recent deci-
sion in Romer indicates the Court's acknowledgement of increased public acceptance
of the homosexual community. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). Thus, any
decision that does not produce a "just" result will be out of step with the Court's
recent trend.
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decision and then forced history and stare decisis to fit with that deci-
sion."
The Roe decision is perhaps the most glaring example of the Court's
willingness to stretch the Constitution in accordance with pressing social
policy concerns.'52 Roe could not make the ethereal nature of the abor-
tion right more apparent. The Court dug deep into personal privacy no-
tions surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment to discover a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy." The Court even suggested that the
Ninth Amendment may reserve the right to the people." 4 Despite the
apparent lack of legal support for the practice, the Court broadened ius
focus, addressing the less specific right to personal autonomy, a right
which the Court found supported by ample precedent." The opinion's
conclusion, however, reflects the true motivation for the decision: "the
demands of the profound problems of the present day."
The Cruzan decision, to the extent that it recognizes a mentally com-
petent person's liberty interest in choosing death, further illustrates the
Court's propensity to arrive at the just conclusion when deeply personal
interests are at stake. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated that the Court inferred the right to die from prior decisions recog-
nizing the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.'57 The opinion,
however, lacks any case law or historical support for the recognition of a
constitutional right to die.' Thus, it is more likely that the modem so-
cietal recognition that "[t]he choice between life and death is a deeply
151. See, e.g., Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1620. Justice Scalia criticized these decisions as
unreasoned or unprincipled. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text. Although
Justice Scalia was not on the Court when it decided Roe, he used his concurrence
and dissent in Casey to express that 'Roe was plainly wrong," as it lacked "reasoned
judgment." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 605 U.S., 883, 983 (1992) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in judgment in part). Justice Scalia's concur-
rence in Cruzan resounds disapproval of the Court's recognition of the right to die.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Scalia made no
attempt to veil his discontent with the Romer decision. See infra notes 161-63 and
accompanying text.
152. See GERHARDT & RowE, supra note 96, at 8-9 ("For many, Roe v. Wade was
the quintessential example of judges illegitimately writing their personal preferences
into constitutional doctrine.").
153. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
154. Id. This notion has expanded into the conception that the Constitution is par-
tially unwritten and grounded in natural law. GERHARDT & RowE, supra note 96, at 9.
155. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
156. Id. at 165.
157. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
158. On the other hand, Justice Scalla's concurrence is replete with historical evi-
dence against the 'constitutional recognition of the right to take one's life. See id. at
294 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality" drove the
opinion.
59
The Court's decision in Romer may suggest that a majority of the cur-
rent Court is willing to achieve the right or just outcome despite a lack
of constitutional or historical support for that conclusion. In Romer, six
members of the Court struck down Colorado's Constitutional Amend-
ment 2, which prohibited the acknowledgment of "Homosexual[s], Lesbi-
an[s], or Bisexual[s]" as a protected class without first amending the
state constitution." As Justice Scalia's dissent illuminates, the majority
arrived at its decision without mention of Bowers v. Hardwick,'
which, only a decade ago, declined to hold that homosexuals were a sus-
pect class deserving of heightened protection.62 The majority ignored
all historical disfavor for laws protecting homosexuals and instead de-
clared that "[i]t is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of
this sort." "
The misfit of the Romer decision in constitutional jurisprudence is also
illustrated by the majority's failure to adhere to the usual constitutional
tests. The Court found that Colorado's law lacked even a rational relation
to "any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective." Accord-
ingly, the Court reserved further comment on the appropriate level of
scrutiny courts should apply to the issue."
As Roe, Cruzan and Romer illustrate, when public policy and senti-
ment dictate, just results follow. In light of these decisions, the Court's
recognition of the right to die with physician assistance would be in
good company.
159. Id. at 281.
160. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996). Colorado adopted the law in a
1992 statewide referendum as a backlash against the enactment of numerous local or-
dinances which prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation in housing, em-
ployment, education, public accommodations, and health and welfare services. Id. The
State intended adoption of the Amendment merely as a repeal of those ordinances.
Id, The Court, however, felt that it placed an extra and unconstitutional obstacle in
the way of the political process for a group of individuals based solely on anti-homo-
sexual animus. Id. at 1628.
161. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
162. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bowers, 498 U.S. at 190-91.
163. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
164. Id. at 1629.
165. Id,
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D. The Scope of Review
Another factor that may affect the Court's analysis and consequent
decision is the scope of the right reviewed. The impact of this factor is
best illustrated by the Court's 1989 decision in Michael H. v. Gerald
D. In Michael H., a plurality of the Court upheld a California pre-
sumption of legitimacy for children born in wedlock, consequently deny-
ing an adulterous father's claim of paternity.167 The Court reviewed a
child's claim that the presumption infringed upon a natural father's right
to obtain visiting rights with his child." Instead of reviewing the histor-
ical recognition of the rights of a natural parent-rights likely to find
ample historical support-the Court narrowed its view to consideration
of whether there was an historical acknowledgment of rights of a natural
parent of a child conceived through an adulterous affair." Not surpris-
ingly, the Court found no cases recognizing this right. 7 °
In his dissent from the plurality opinion in Michael H., Justice Brennan
criticized the Court for limiting its scope to such a specific right. '7 This
approach, expressed Justice Brennan, was out of step with the Court's
other cases regarding fundamental liberty interests."7 The proper ap-
proach would have been to discuss "whether parenthood is an interest
that historically has received our attention and protection; the answer to
that question is too clear for dispute."
173
The way in which the Court defines the right reviewed in this case will
undoubtedly affect the ultimate conclusion. Had the Roe Court consid-
ered whether abortion was a liberty interest rooted in historical protec-
tion, it is doubtful that the practice would have received approval. 74 By
focusing instead on the more broadly construed right to personal privacy,
166. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
167. Id. at 130.
168. Id. at 130-32.
169. Id. at 126-27.
170. Id. at 127. Justice Scalia, author of the plurality decision, declared, "This is not
the stuff of which fundamental rights qualifying as liberty interests are made." Id.
171. Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Gail A. Secor, Michael H. v. Ger-
ald D.: Due Process and Equal Protection Rights of Unwed Fathers, 17 HASTINGS
CONsT. LQ. 759, 780-81 (1990) (discussing Justice Scalia's narrow focus in Michati
H.).
172. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Mary Kay
Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 65 Tu. L REv. 585, 586 (1991) (suggesting that the Michael H. decision is incon-
sistent with the Court's other parenthood decisions).
173. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The
court decided that question in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
174. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
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the Court avoided the negative historical evidence that would have assur-
edly defeated the due process challenge.'75
Similarly, had the Bowers Court set its sights on the right to privacy,
recognized by the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut to uphold a married
couple's right to make contraceptive choices, 76 the result may have
been drastically different. By focusing on the much more circumscribed
question of whether history supports a recognition of a homosexual
individual's right to engage in acts of sodomy, the Court was able to
deny protection and apply a lower degree of scrutiny to laws prohibiting
the practice.'7 7
If the Court approaches the right to die as falling under the right to
privacy recognized by Griswold and Roe, the chance that the right will
be protected as a fundamental liberty interest is great.'78 If the Court
takes a more limited approach, however, and searches for historical
support for the right to physician-assisted suicide, it is unlikely that the
right will find constitutional protection.
E. Coming Full Circle
"To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under
the heaven: A time to be born, and a time to die.... ."' A finding that
a mentally competent, terminally ill individual has a protected liberty
interest in dying with dignity through the assistance of a physician is not
a stretch of the liberty interests already recognized by the Court. There
exists a protected liberty interest in marriage,"w procreation, 8' abor-
tion and contraception, 2 child rearing,8 3 education,'8 4 and the
175. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
176. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
177. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-95 (1986).
178. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
179. Ecclesiastes 3:1.
180. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (holding a Virginia law prohibiting inter-
racial marriages invalid).
181. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding a Massachusetts law pro-
hibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons unconstitutional);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942) (finding act requiring the sterilization
of habitual criminals unconstitutional).
182. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
183. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)' (recognizing a parental
right to make child rearing decisions).
184. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 391 (1923) (determining that a law forbidding
the teaching of any modem language other than English before the eighth grade vio-
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rejecting of life-sustaining medical treatment.", The right to personal
autonomy and rejection of unwanted governmental interference begins
with the intensely individual choice to create life, and it should end with
the equally personal decision to end life, while encompassing the rights
to education and marriage. The Court's recognition that there is a funda-
mental right for a terminally ill individual to choose the time and manner
of death will bring us full circle in the liberty arena
V. CONCLUSION
If the Court extends constitutional protection to the right for mentally
competent, terminally ill adults to seek the aid of physicians to adminis-
ter or prescribe life-ending drugs, the exact scope of the right will likely
be a question suffusing our courts for the next twenty-five years."
That opportunity will properly allow the states to structure the right to
fit with their own individualized policies and procedures, which may
differ from other states.'87 By taking the issue of physician-assisted sui-
cide for review, the Court has given itself an opportunity to provide or
deny great relief to a growing population of suffering individuals.'" Re-
gardless of the Court's decision, the issue, like the problem of terminal
illness, will not soon disappear.'"
JENNIFER COLE POPICK
lated the Fourteenth Amendment).
185. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
186. "'If the Court recognizes a constitutional right for terminally ill adults, within a
year, [there will be] 50 lawsuits to stretch the outer limits of this right'" Hinz, supra
note 101, at *2 (quoting commentator and Professor Yale Kamisar, Clarence Darrow
Distinguished University Professor at the University of Michigan Law School).
187. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 292 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Justice
O'Connor expressed that "the more challenging task of crafting appropriate proce-
dures for safeguarding... liberty interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the
States." Id.
188. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
189. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 796 (9th Cir.) (noting, with
regret, that terminal illness will always be with us), cert. granted sub nom., Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
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